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Stalinization, de-Stalinization,  
and re-Stalinization.  
1953 behind the “Iron Curtain”
“De-Stalinization did not start with Khrushchev’s denun-
ciation of Stalin in early 1956. 
The first and the essential act of de-Stalinization was the 
death of Stalin”
Robert C. Tucker1
Abstract
The aim of the article is to present the changesthattook place after the death of Joseph 
Stalin in  1953 in  the Soviet Union and in  somecountriesincluded in  its “externalem-
pire”. The “Iron Curtain”, which divided the worldintotwoparts, began to shiftafter the 
Generalissimo’sdeath and revealed differences in  the approach of  individualcountries 
to the „newcourse” announced by Stalin’ssuccessors.
In somecountries, the death of the Kremlindictatorbeganchanges in the policy of the time, 
in others the methodscharacteristic of Stalinismwerecontinued, whichmeant the activity 
of anall-powerfulapparatus of repressionseeking real and imagined “enemies”, the cen-
tral authority of unlimitedpower with mass terror and striving for totalcontrol of citizens 
and allmanifestations of social life. The textpresents the most importantelements of the 
policy of  the Communistparties in  the Soviet Union, GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
 1 R. C. Tucker, The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization, “World Politics” (1957), Vol. 9, No. 4 
(Jul.), pp. 561.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 9 (2019) Number 2, p. 25–3926
Romania and Bulgaria in 1953 whichwereconsistent with the process of re-Stalinization, 
characterized by similarity to governmentsduring the dictator’s life and de-Stalinization, 
thatis, the reversals of methods and toolsknown in the Stalinism period.
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One of the most important events of 1953 that had serious consequences not 
only for the countries behind the “Iron Curtain” was the death of Joseph Stalin 
on 5 Marchin his KuntsevoDachain the suburbs of Moscow. The following day, 
this information made the headlines of the newspapers in the Eastern bloc 
countries.“The heart of the greatest man of our time, the companion Joseph 
Vissaronovich Stalin, stopped beating”, read the“Neues Deutschland”, the chief 
press organ of the SED East German communist party. The newspapers quoted 
the communicationreleased by the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, which read about the death of “a companion fighter and 
brilliant continuator of the work of Lenin, wise Leader and Teacher of the 
Communist Party and the Soviet people.”2 The most important places in the 
capitals of Central Europe, such as Wenceslas Square in Prague or Alexander-
platz in Berlin, were overflowing with mourners, the radio broadcast funeral 
music, and in front of the photographs of the “great linguist” honorary guards 
were held. Despite these manifestations of the cult of the individual, a large 
part of the society and members of the party apparatus werehoping that the 
death of the 9dictator would give rise to necessary reforms in the crisis-ridden 
communist system.
This article outlines the changes which took place in 1953 in the Soviet Union 
and in some of the countries making up its “external empire”, i.e. the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.3 Following the Generalis-
simo’s death, the Iron Curtain, which haddivided the world several years earlier 
into two parts began to be more see-through and the differences in the approach 
 2 Przestało bić serce wodza ludzkości – Wielkiego Stalina, „Trybuna Ludu”, 6.03.1953, p. 1.
 3 The article does not describe events in  Poland, which are the subject of  detailed 
considerations in other texts published in the volume. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
in Poland no attempts were undertaken to introduce the “new course” in 1953.
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of  individual countries to  the “new course” announced by  the  successors 
of  Stalin4 were made apparent.
1. The Soviet Union under the rule of Beria and Malenkov
One of the Gulag physicians described the deceased ruler of the empire as “a ty-
rant who would have that one huge country by the short hairs, and that the fate 
of each prisoner was in this way or other tied with the Stalin’s own fate”. After 
5 March, it dawned on many that the system would not survive in its the shape 
of that time, and the necessary transformation of the regime would affect not 
only the lives of prisoners, but also ofthose of all citizens. The need for reforms 
was evidenced by the fact that,even at the funeral of Stalin Georgy Malenkov, 
his contemporaries surprisingly stated that the two systems – socialist and capi-
talist – may coexist peacefully. The “new course” in the Soviet Union spanned 
several levels: structures of power, terror apparatus, economy, andinternal and 
foreign policies. The changesintroduced in the USSR from that moment were 
called the‘thaw’, the name having been coined by Ilia Ehrenburg’s novel or even 
Beria’sBlitzkrieg, following the well-known French Sovietologist.5
After the death of Stalin, collective leadership of the supreme state bodies 
was introduced, thus dismantling the function of the secretary general of the 
Communist party of the Soviet Union and separating party and state functions. 
The key persons in the country were the founder of SMERSH counterintelligence, 
Lavrentiy Beria, at the head of the powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs, which 
was in control of the entire apparatus of violence, Malenkov – the new chairman 
of the Council of Ministers and Nikita Khrushchev – secretary of the Central 
Committee seeking to take control of the party. Many observers were surprised 
by the fact that the close associates of Stalin were in fact the driving force behind 
 4 Some historians, namely Jerzy Holzer, termed the reforms introduced after the death 
of Stalin as the“new course”. Stalinization is understood as introducing first of all political and 
economic changes as modelled by the Soviet Union, the activity of an omnipotent apparatus 
of repression, seeking real and imagined enemies, wielding unlimited power by the central 
authority as well as mass terror and striving to take over total control over citizens and all 
manifestations of social life. Re-Stalinization means a return to the governance when under 
the dictatorship, and de-Stalinization is a shift away from the methods and tools of governance 
known during the Stalinist period.
 5 F. Thom, Beria. Oprawca bez skazy, translated by K. Antkowiak, Warsaw 2016, Prószyński 
i S-ka, p. 776.
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the de-Stalinization process. The members of this triumvirate, however, were 
aware of the large scale of social dissatisfaction resulting from the failure of the 
entire system. Despite the passage of over 30 years since the Bolshevik take-
over of power, the promises of communist ideologists about “heaven on Earth” 
did not come to fruition. Quite the opposite: the society’s living standard was 
low, the ineffective economy did not produce enough consumer goods, which 
in turn resulted in permanent shortages of basic foodstuffs, while a huge army 
and 2.5 million prisoners generated enormous costs, and ubiquitous terror and 
widespread fear of repression paralyzed any development of the country. Ac-
cording to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the use of terror of that 
sort became a threat to the party and the state.6 The new leadership resolved, 
therefore,to do away with the most repressive features of Stalinism in order to re-
form the system. In the systemic aspect, the “new course”concernedextending 
the rights of state administration bodies at the expense of party apparatus and 
federalisation of the country, including the rights of indigenous people.7 The 
changes introduced in the nationalist policy of the USSR consisted, among oth-
ers, in the restoration of autonomy of certain minorities living in the empire and 
the principle of appointingactivists from the domestic party apparatus to senior 
positions in individual republics.
A shift away from mass repression was also initiated, while the powers of the 
secret police were reduced. Although administrative and criminal law measure-
swere still in use against the political opponents, this was done on a smaller scale 
than in previous years. On 27 March, an amnesty was announced, as a result 
of which some 1.2 million people, or approximately 48% of convicts were re-
leased from labour camps and prisons. Beria ordered a halt to the Gulag huge 
construction investments, which had taken lives of tens of thousands of people, 
and interrupted the investigation of the Kremlin physicians accused of con-
spiracy to murder Soviet leaders. At the beginning of April, torture was officially 
abolished and stigmatized for “violation of socialist law and order”8, and in Sep-
tember the so-called lex Kirov of 1934, which allowed the introduction of ad hoc 
judicature, rendering judgments in absentia, without the presence of defenders 
 6 A. Hilger, op. cit., p. 107. Soviet security police did not, however, completely give up the 
extra-legal means of pressure.
 7 L.  Bazylow, P.  Wieczorkiewicz, Historia Rosji, Wrocław 2010, Zakład Narodowy 
im. Ossolińskich, p. 486.
 8 Soviet security police did not, however, completely give up the extra-legal means 
of pressure.
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and the chance of appealing. The “new course” reforms were so revolutionary 
that some of the Soviet comrades formed a conspiracyagainst Beria, headed 
by one of the triumvirate members, Khrushchev.
The economy was in a dire state. The country was unable to feed itself, the 
evidence being the fact that Moscow was short of even the basic foodstuffs. 
It came as no surprise that the reforms concerned also the economic policy: 
outlays on the development of the electricity and food industries were increased, 
while fiscal burdens for peasants were reduced, which almost immediately 
contributed to the elimination of the problem of food shortages in villages and 
smaller towns.9
Following 5 March, the process of de-Stalinization also concerned the Soviet 
foreign policy, which at that time contributed to the stabilization of the inter-
national system. Effective implementation and maintenance of reforms would 
not have been possible without the relaxation of relations with other countries. 
In July, the USSR resumed diplomatic relations with Israel, while anti-Yugoslav 
propaganda was hushed up. On July 27, a cease-fire was signed in Korea to ter-
minate the largest armed conflict after World War II, having claimed lives 
of 3 million victims. In August, Prime Minister Malenkov gave a key speech, 
noting that for the first time since the end of World War II, after a prolonged 
period of growing tension, there occurred“some defuse of the international 
atmosphere”. “We believe,” Prime Minister Malenkov declared, “that there are 
no objective grounds for clashes between the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union.”10 Of significance was the fact that the Soviet prime minister closed 
his speech mentioning the necessity of building communism only in the USSR, 
and – unlike the previous Kremlin rulers – all over the world.
The new leadership of the CPSU was also planning to reduce the domina-
tion over satellite states and to pursue some staff changes. Pressure was put 
on communist parties in Eastern Europe to liberalize their internal and foreign 
policies. Beria instructed communist party leaders in Eastern Europe to mitigate 
economic policy, especially in relation to workers, peasants, and the middle 
class. This was a consequence of the threat of a revolt of societies in commu-
nist countries, in which – just as in the Soviet Union itself – there prevailed 
 9 Najnowsza historia świata, t. I: 1945–1963, ed. A. Patek, J. Rydel, J.J. Węc, Kraków 1997, 
p. 288.
 10 G.M. Malenkow, Przemówienie na V Sesji Rady Najwyższej ZSRR 8 sierpnia 1953 r., 
Warszawa 1953, p. 40.
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an atmosphere of fear of the authorities’ repression and a dire economic situ-
ation. This was attributed to costly militarization, collectivization, permanent 
shortages of consumer goods, too rapid industrialization and expansion of heavy 
industry against the increasing pauperization of large social strata. The situation 
in the other countries of the bloc, however, was even harder to control. It was 
the GDR where the most serious crisis of 1953 broke out.
2. The uprising behind the “Iron Curtain”
In the first years of existence of the GDR, the Soviet rule was characterized by ele-
ments introduced by communists: strict work discipline, collective farming, ex-
pansion of the heavy industry at the expense of the light industry as well as bear-
ing the costs of upkeep of the Soviet army. The deterioration of the economic 
situation, year after year, the fear of compulsory collectivization, and the con-
fiscation of property resulted in hundreds of thousands of Germans emigrating 
to West Germany thereby establishing two separate German states. It is estimated 
that from 1950 to mid-1953, some 800,000 GDR citizens left their homes. In 1953, 
the communists continued the policy of fighting the Churches. In all the countries 
subordinated to the Soviets, there ensued the nationalization of church property, 
while priests were subjected to threats and arrest. On 1 January a ban on teaching 
religion in school premises in the GDR came into force. A brutal anti-church 
campaign was also unleashed, targeted especially at the popular Evangelical 
Young Community (Junge Gemeinde), which was accused of “activities of se-
cret agents” and “espionage”. Approximately 3,000 students were expelled from 
schools as part of their penalty for their membership in  religious communities.11
The death of Stalin did not contribute to the liberation of the policies of lo-
cal communists. On the contrary: on 28 May 1953, the Council of Ministers 
adopted a regulation raising labour standards by 10%. In the same month, the 
large metallurgical city of Eisenhüttenstadtchanged its name to “the city of Sta-
lin” (Stalinstadt), which -similarly to the Polish Nowa Huta near Kraków or the 
Hungarian Sztálinváros – was to be an ideal communist city, free of churches 
and any encumbrances standing for the “former work values“. The Soviets feared 
that pursuing such a policy could lead to an uncontrolled outbreak of social 
 11 J. Tarasiński, Komuniści wobec Kościołów w Niemieckiej Republice Demokratycznej 
w latach 1949–1978, Toruń 2013, Europejskie Centrum Edukacyjne, p. 120.
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discontent. At the beginning of June, the SED leaders held a discussion in the 
Soviet politburo, during which they were ordered to introduce a “new course” 
leading to “healing” of the situation in the GDR. The other communist lead-
ers were repeatedly told that the criticism refers “not to individual countries, 
but to all people’s democracies.”12 Yet, it was already too late to introduce any 
changes that would stop the growing uproar of society.
On 16 June, the East Berlin workers- possibly after having been inspired by the 
activities of Khrushchev and his supporters13 – took the plunge and stepped 
up against the raised labour standards. The following day a general strike be-
gan in the capital of the GDR, and numerous protests were observed across the 
country. Thousands of Germans, encouraged by Stalin’s death and certain signs 
of liberalization, took to the streets of many cities. About half a million people 
insome 600 plants across the country were on strike, and in the various demon-
strations there could have been up to one and a half million people taking part. 
The protesters saw the announcement of a new course in the party policy as insuf-
ficient: they demanded lowering labour standards, reducing food prices and the 
implementation of political postulates: the resignation of the government and 
the SED secretary, Walter Ulbricht as well as the introduction of free elections. 
Thousands of protests were brutally repressed by the Soviet army: over 50 people 
were killed, while 16,000 were imprisoned.14 The situation in this country showed 
the failure of the communist system as if through a lens: an attempt to control 
all aspects of social life led to the launching of a revolt. The East German protest 
against extremely high standards turned into a protest against the entire system.
The revolution in the GDR had yet another victim, to the surprise of many. 
On 26 June, Khrushchev brought to life the plan to arrest Beria, who was ac-
cused, among others, of the liability for the unrest in Eastern Germany and 
–which was typical of the previous period of government – espionage for the 
benefit of “imperialism”.15 The arrest of this most important supporter of de- 
 12 As cited in: A. Applebaum, Za żelazną kurtyną. Ujarzmienie Europy Wschodniej 1944–
1956, translated by B. Gadomska, Warszawa 2018, Wydawnictwo Agora, p. 496.
 13 The stance taken by, to name but one, Professor P. Wieczorkiewicz. See L. Bazylow, 
P. Wieczorkiewicz, op. cit., p. 487. 
 14 J. Holzer, op. cit., p. 355.
 15 Malenkov was later to call Beria “the enemy of the nation” and “fierce agent of imperialism” 
(Idem, op. cit., p. 38). He was also accused of introducing a dictatorship, his actions having been 
described as “an attempt to put the Ministry of the Interior over the party and government” 
(A. Hilger, op. cit., p. 56).
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Stalinization and the weakening position of Malenkov affected to a great ex-
tent the policy of the Eastern bloc countries. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, 
who at that time was not supportive ofall the “new course” reforms, began 
to strengthen his grip. However, the changes were not to be withdrawn, with 
one exception: the possibility of hanging portraits of living communist leaders 
in public offices was allowed again. Economic reforms were continued: in August, 
the tax imposed on the peasants was lowered, and in September 1953, Khrush-
chev announced an increase in the buying-in prices, which resulted in solving 
problems with the supply of foodstuffs.16
The progress of de-Stalinisation in the GDR was slowed down following the 
arrest of Beria. The reformers were condemned, in turn strengthening the power 
of Ulbricht, who centralized his control by securing it with the help of the secu-
rity police. Ulbricht did, however, introduce some of the elements of the “new 
course”, i.e. establishing lower labour standards, raising the standard of living 
by, for instance, reducing prices of foodstuffs in October 1953 and introducing 
more a subtle repression of the Churches.17
3. The rule and restriction of the power of “Stalin’s best pupil”
During Stalinism, the Hungarian society was subjected to enormous repres-
sion. The then leader MátyásRákosi, termed “the best pupil of Stalin” found 
terror to be an obvious way of exercising power. In the years 1948–1953, the 
number of convicts ranged from 700,000 to 800,000 people.18 They were sent 
to prisons, labour camps, or internment camps. The economic situation of the 
state – similarly to other countries in that region – was dire. Despite gigantic 
expenditures on investments, the population’s standard of living was dropping 
year after year. These problems were compounded by the fact that Hungary had 
to pay huge war reparations to the USSR. It is estimated that as late as 1953, 70% 
of industrial output went to the Soviet Union.19
 16 R. Pichoja, Historia władzy w Związku Radzieckim 1945–1991, translated by Michał 
Głuszkowski, Piotr Zemszał, Warszawa 2011, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 134.
 17 See J. Tarasiński, op.cit., p. 126–127.
 18 K. Bartosek, Europa Środkowa i Południowo-Wschodnia, in: Czarna księga komunizmu. 
Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania, ed. S. Courtois et al., Warszawa 1999, Prószyński i S-ka, p. 390.
 19 R. Service, Towarzysze. Komunizm od początku do upadku. Historia zbrodniczej ideologii, 
translated by Hanna Szczerkowska, Kraków 2008, Wydawnictwo Znak, p. 375.
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Similarly to the GDR, the death of Stalin did not affect immediate changes 
in the Hungary’s policy. This took place only after the July visit of the Hungarian 
communists to Moscow. “Horrified” by the crimes and terror, but also by the 
possibility of losing their influence in Budapest, the Russians demanded that 
Hungarian comrades would refrain from the use of mass terror, rehabilitate the 
repressed and introduce changes in the economic activity. Rákosi was forced 
to change the course of the policies of the time, as well as to make a statement 
expressing self-criticism at the meeting of the Central Committee, which ad-
opted a resolution on the “distortion of socialism”, and finally to resign from the 
post of prime minister.20 Similar staff changes occurred in all countries of the 
region. The communists, accustomed to concentrating several positions in their 
hands, were now faced with a choice: they would either retain power over the 
party or over the government.
The new Hungarian Prime Minister was Imre Nagy, a supporter of more 
liberal methods of exercising power, who mitigated the “ruthlessness and non-
sense of Stalinism”21 by announcing a partial amnesty and rehabilitating many 
victims. Nagy liquidated forced labour camps and ad hoc courts, stopped hasty 
industrialization, raised wages and – similar to the USSR – the production 
of consumer goods. Over 1/3 of peasants exercised their right to withdraw from 
agricultural cooperatives. Culture also developed during Nagy’s rule. Launch-
ing the changes in question was meant to eliminate the atmosphere of terror 
and to improve the difficult economic situation of the country. As long as Nagy 
enjoyed the support of Moscow, certain de-Stalinization processes were not 
threatened – despite constant attacks of Rákosi and his supporters. The situation 
lasted until the beginning of 1955.
De-stalinization in Hungary, however, did not cover all aspects of social 
life. Initiated in Moscow, the “new course” policy did not include religious 
freedom, nor did it affect the relations with the Hungarian religious communi-
ties. The rulers continued their hostile policy against the Church. The question 
of staffing the key positions in the Church was of utmost importance. In 1953, 
the decree on the influence of the State Council on the appointment of senior 
clerical functions had already been in effect for two years. That year, the most 
important clergy were confined in Stalinist prisons: the Primate of Hungary, 
 20 He did, however, retain the function of the first secretary of the Hungarian Workers’ 
Party (MDP).
 21 I. Romsics, op. cit., p. 388.
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cardinal Mindszenty, who, in 1949, following a brutal investigation received a life 
sentence for “high treason” and “espionage”; his successor holding the position 
of the chairman of the Conference of the Hungarian Episcopate, Archbishop 
József Grősz and György Bulányi, who had created an underground church, 
in the opposition against the pro-government movement of „priests of peace”. 
Hence, Hungarian Catholics were to wait for any changes in the state-Church 
relationship for three more years.
4. The origins and course of protests in Czechoslovakia
The early 1953saw the reforms of the “thaw” as inevitable and spanning all com-
munist bloc countries. However, not all the countries in question followed 
the model set by the USSR. In Czechoslovakia, in the month of Stalin’s death 
there occurred a change of power: the first secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) was Antonín Novotný, the 
president – Antonin Zápatocký, and the head of government – Viliam Široký. 
The shifts of the key positions in the state did not mean a radical departure 
from the totalitarian methods of exercising power. The amnesty of early May 
1953 did not include political prisoners, and a year later, in the Bratislava court 
there a show was put on – a case trial in which sentences of long-term impris-
onment, including life sentences, were rendered.22 In 1953, Bohumil Laušman, 
the former chairman of social democracy was abducted in Austria, spending 
the following ten years in prison.
Similarly to Hungary, repression was maintained against the Catholic Church, 
which, since 1950, had been functioning without male religious orders, educa-
tion, or the press. A year later, almost all bishops from the Czech, Moravia, and 
Slovakia were arrested. The phase of the harshest repression came to an end 
in 1952, when the Church, both in the Czech and Slovakia, was entirely broken.23 
This dramatic situation may be evidenced by the fact that in 1953 (until 1965) only 
 22 The first amnesty for political prisoners in Czechoslovakia took place only in 1960(see 
J. Cuhra, Dyskusja. Zróżnicowanie represji wobec duchowieństwa w krajach byłego bloku 
wschodniego w okresie stalinowskim, w: Represje wobec duchowieństwa…, p. 86).
 23 A. Grajewski, Chronologia i historyczne uwarunkowania represji wobec duchowieństwa 
katolickiego w krajach Europy Środkowej, in: Represje wobec…, p. 26.
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one bishop, Antonin Eltschner, pursued religious activity in the Czech lands.24 
In that year, the Czechoslovak communists undertook the last actions towards 
religious communities, in order to establish the already introduced changes and 
undertook a large-scale propaganda campaign to reconcile the public with its 
policy.25Any reforms which were introduced in Czechoslovakia in the spirit 
of Beria’s “new course”, were in fact merely a cosmetic amendment. Despite the 
dismissal of Karel Bacílek, minister of public security, he was entrusted with 
a high party position.
Similarly to the other people’s democratic countries, the country’s economic 
situation was dramatic: inflation was rampant and the living standard of the 
population was at a very low level. On 30 May 1953, the government of Viliam 
Široki made a disastrous decision to introduce a currency reform that in fact 
liquidated a large portion of citizens’ savings and reduced their wages. Follow-
ing this, the public gave vent to their dissatisfaction by organizing numerous 
demonstrations, including in Pilsen, Prague, Třinec, Brno and mines in the 
Ostrava region. Free elections were demanded during public speeches. The 
largest rebellion took place on 1 June in Pilzno, where some 20,000 employees 
of the Škoda plant went on strike. The demonstrators took over the seat of the 
city authorities, burnt the Soviet flags, and tore the portraits of communist 
leaders to pieces. The clashes with security forces led to, according to official 
data, six casualties.
5. The Stalinist rule in Romania and Bulgaria
After Stalin’s death, the reforms were also announced in Romania – a country 
where the repressions during the Stalinist period were extremely cruel. The dis-
tinguishing element for the terror system in Romania was the use of “brainwash-
ing” methods, once known in Asia, such as torturing prisoners by other prisoners. 
As early as 4 April 1953, an amnesty was adopted, the earliest event taken place 
from all countries of the communist bloc. There had also been some liberaliza-
tion of economic policy which consisted in taking greater account of the growing 
consumer needs of the society and the temporary suspension of collectivization. 
 24 J. Cuhra, Represje wobec duchownych i wiernych na ziemiach czeskich w latach 1948–1962, 
in: Represje wobec…, p. 55.
 25 See A. Grajewski, op. cit., p. 26.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 9 (2019) Number 2, p. 25–3936
On 18 July 1953, the construction of the Danube Canal – Black Sea, which had 
begun four years earlier, was stopped, the canal having been intended to ease 
the transport of ships up the River Danube in the event of an armed conflict 
with Yugoslavia. Because of the huge sacrifices associated with its construction, 
it was termed the “death channel” or “tomb of the Romanian bourgeois”. At the 
August Plenum of the Central Committee, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej criticized 
manifestations of the cult of the individual. The above changes, which to some 
extent formed part of the de-Stalinization processes, did not mean that severe 
repression against political opponents would stop, as evidenced by the 1954 
execution of Lucretiu Pătrăşcanu, the former Minister of Justice.
In 1953, the Bulgarian Communist Party was led by ValkoChervenkov, who 
following the death of Stalin initiated liberalization of the economy. In many 
respects, Bulgaria resembled another Soviet republic. The Bulgarian Ambassador 
in Moscow was ex officio the Minister of Government in Sofia, and the Ambas-
sador of the USSR was openly accompanying the key persons in the state during 
important events.26 In May 1953, protests of tobacco factory workers took place 
in Plovdiv, the incident having particularly alarmed the Kremlin leadership since 
until then the Bulgarian society had not taken such strong a stance against the 
communist authorities.27 The “new course” meant – according to suggestions 
from Moscow – the need for collective management, criticism of past mistakes, 
and in the economy – the reduction of the output of heavy industry for the 
benefit of consumer products and farming produce. 9 September marking the 
anniversary of “liberation”, an amnesty was granted, releasing 10,000person 
from prisons and camps. The foreign policy of this country was also relaxed. 
At the end of 1953 an agreement on trade with Greece was signed, after a seri-
ous border dispute had taken place a year earlier as a result of the occupation 
by the Bulgarian army of two islands on the Marica River. Both in Romania and 
Bulgaria, the “new course” reforms were introduced by Stalinists, who in the 
turbulent year of 1953 managed to retain power.
 26 B. Jelavich, Historia Bałkanów, v. II: wiek XX, translated by Marek Chojnacki, Justyn 
Hunia, Kraków 2005, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, p. 382.
 27 As cited in: A. Applebaum, Za żelazną kurtyną…, p. 494.
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6. Conclusion
In 1953, it transpired that, contrary to ideological claims, the Soviet bloc was, 
in fact, not a monolith, and the differences in pursuing policies by individual 
communist states were becoming ever more apparent. The leaders of some 
of these countries believed that certain system reforms should be introduced. 
Amongst them were the USSR and Bulgaria, somewhat later Romania and – fol-
lowing a visit to the Kremlin of the MDP communist party leaders – Hungary. 
The GDR communists did not manage to implement the large scale reforms 
postulated by the Soviets due to their own dislike of the “new course” and the 
outbreak of the rebellion on 16 June. However, in no country was de-Stalinization 
to cover all aspects of social life. An example is the religious policy in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, where the atheization of the country was carried 
out using ruthless repression against the Churches. De-Stalinization was intro-
duced for fear of losing the power. The “new course” concerned those aspects 
of policy which would enable the communists to wield unrestricted power in the 
societies which – to the surprise of the communists – were to show resistance 
against the influence of propaganda and the economic “successes” of the new 
system. The processes of de-Stalinization initiated in some countries did not, 
of course, mean that the USSR would forego its domination over the entire 
communist states’ bloc.
Not all of the discussed communist states followed the Soviet Union model. 
Some leaders stalled taking the decision on introducing reforms, awaiting the 
final outcome of the fight for the Stalin’s legacy. They were hoping that the lib-
eralization of the party policy taking place in Crimea was only temporary and 
soon the old and proven methods would be back in place. Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratic Republic, and Poland were, to a limited extent, implement-
ing the “new course” reforms, while in many cases still applying the instruments 
of governance characteristic of the Stalin era.
Accelerated de-Stalinization in some of the communist countries lasted 
until mid-1953. During this time, rebellions in various forms and of various 
levels of  intensity broke out in Eastern Europe, while the conflict between 
Stalinists and their opponents would continue to grow. The breakthrough was 
marked by the outbreak of the uprising in the GDR. The new Kremlin leader-
ship shirked the responsibility for these events onto their predecessors, thus 
leading to the arrest of the once powerful Beria. Removing and then killing 
this key supporter of changes lead to a significant decline in the enthusiasm 
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of the reformers across the entire Soviet bloc. However, this could not prevent 
the launch of de-Stalinization in a long-term perspective, because in all Eastern 
European countries, social discontent due to mass terror, sovietization, forced 
collectivization, and inefficient consumer industry would soar to high levels. 
The new Kremlin ruler, although in 1953 had opposed radical settlements with 
the Stalin rule, could not stop the necessary reforms. For another significant 
event one would have to wait three more years, until the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party when Khrushchev himself – already openly and casting 
no doubt – took a stance against Stalin, criticizing the cult of the individual.
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